Presidential Reelection Reforms in Latin America (1977-2025)
by Fabián Alejandro Acuña Villarraga
PhD in Social Science Research from FLACSO-Mexico, researcher at the Observatory of Political Reforms in Latin America (UNAM-OAS), and professor at UNAD Colombia.
Historically, Latin America has been a region marked by the tension between power concentration and efforts to consolidate democratic systems. One of the phenomena that best illustrates this dynamic is presidential reelection. Between 1977 and 2025, different countries have implemented political reforms to either enable or restrict presidential reelection. This article examines these reforms, the types of reelection, the mechanisms used to implement them, and the emblematic cases that have shaped the region's history. To do so, it relies on and updates the “Executive Power in Latin America” database, from the #ReformsObservatory (2021)1 .
1. Political reforms on presidential reelection.
The countries in the region have enacted 39 political reforms to either enable or restrict presidential reelection. These reforms have been continuous throughout the period, with peaks in 1983, when three countries enacted this type of reform (Argentina, El Salvador, and Panama), and in 2015, when four countries did the same (Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic) (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Number of Presidential Reelection Reforms in Latin America by Year (1977 - 2025)
Source: Author’s elaboration, updated with data from #ReformsObservatory (2021)
Reforms regarding presidential reelection can be categorized into four types: immediate, alternate, prohibition of reelection, and indefinite reelection. The latter has been widely criticized for its potential to perpetuate leaders in power (Treminio Sánchez, 2013; Acuña Villarraga, 2022).
Table 1. Types of Presidential Reelection Reforms
Source: Author´s elaboration, based on information of (Treminio Sánchez, 2013), (Acuña Villarraga, 2022).
Some countries, including Honduras (1982), Guatemala (1985), and Colombia (1991), established a clause prohibiting presidential reelection in their constitutional framework during their transition to democracy. Other countries, such as Nicaragua (1995) and Colombia (2015), introduced this clause through legislative reform.
Immediate reelection allows an incumbent president to run for an additional consecutive term. It has been the most common modality in the region and has frequently been used to modify the constitutional or legal framework, favoring the reelection of those in power, such as Presidents Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1993 ) and Álvaro Uribe in Colombia (2005).
Alternate reelection or non-consecutive reelection allows a former President to run for office again after one or two terms out of power. This model is less controversial, as it includes a gap between terms that facilitate leadership renewal. An example of this was the reform in Peru that changed the immediate reelection provision in the 1993 Constitution to allow reelection after one term (2002), enabling former President Alan García to serve two non-consecutive terms (1985-1990 and 2006-2011).
Unlimited or indefinite reelection enables an incumbent president to run for office without term limits. These types of reforms have been associated with populist regimes that have led to processes of power concentration and a tendency toward the erosion of democratic institutions. Such reforms have occurred in countries like Paraguay (1977), Venezuela (2009), Ecuador (2015), Nicaragua (2014), and Bolivia (2016) (Acuña Villarraga, 2015 and 2022).
2. Orientation of the reforms: to enable or restrict reelection
Political reforms related to presidential reelection typically have two main orientations: to enable or restrict reelection (Buquet, 2007; Došek, 2018; Acuña Villarraga, 2022). In this regard, reforms can be expansive when they modify previous legal frameworks with the aim of enabling or amplifying the possibility of presidential reelection or restrictive when they seek to prohibit it. Expansive reforms have been more frequent (67%) than restrictive ones (33%) in the region (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Orientation of the reforms on presidential reelection
Source: Author's elaboration, based on information from Buquet (2007), Došek (2018), and Acuña Villarraga (2022).
Expansive reforms are frequently promoted to favor a political leadership seeking to extend their time in power, which has sparked intense debates regarding the impact on democratic processes. For example, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela promoted a new constitution in 1999 that enabled immediate reelection, and in 2009, through a referendum, approved indefinite reelection.
Bolivia's new constitution (2009) allowed consecutive reelection, which benefited Evo Morales, who governed from 2006 to 2019. In 2016, he sought to enable indefinite reelection through a referendum, but it was rejected. However, in 2017, the Constitutional Court granted Morales permission to run for office again, which led to a political crisis that culminated with his resignation in 2019 (Welp and Lissidini, 2017).
Facing the risks of power concentration, many countries have implemented restrictive reforms to prohibit or reduce the possibility of presidential reelection. These reforms aim to strengthen democratic institutions and prevent the emergence of authoritarian regimes. For instance, Paraguay´s constitution of 1992 prohibited presidential reelection. In 2017, an attempt to reform and enable it was rejected.
In Peru, a restrictive reform was enacted in 2000 to permit alternate reelection, setting limits to the immediate reelection stipulated in the 1990 Constitution. In Ecuador, the authorization for immediate reelection was reduced through a referendum after the previous authorization for unlimited reelection in 2015 (Acuña Villarraga, 2022).
3. Pathways for Presidential Reelection Reforms
Reforms regarding presidential reelection have been implemented through various channels, each with distinct implications for legitimacy and democratic stability (Table 2).
Table 2. Pathways for Presidential Reelection Reforms
Source: Author's elaboration, based on information from Treminio Sánchez (2013) and Acuña Villarraga (2022).
Constitutional: The creation of new constitutions has been a common mechanism to enable presidential reelection (expansive reform), as seen in the 1999 Constitution of Venezuela, the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador, and the 2009 Constitution of Bolivia, which allowed immediate reelection. However, new constitutions have also been used to prohibit reelection (contractive reform), as in the case of the constitutions of Honduras (1982), Guatemala (1985), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), and Dominican Republic (1994).
Jurisdictional: Constitutional courts have been a key factor in the interpretation of reelection norms. In these cases, judicial decisions are seen as favoring the interests of incumbent governments, which has sparked about judicial independence, the separation of powers, and the risk of power concentration in the presidential figure.
The Constitutional Court of Costa Rica allowed non-consecutive reelection in 2003, which paved the way for the comeback of Oscar Arias to the presidency in 2006.
In Nicaragua, the Supreme Court endorsed the indefinite reelection of Daniel Ortega in 2014, consolidating his permanence in power.
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Honduras rescinded the absolute prohibition of reelection, enabling the controversial reelection of Juan Orlando Hernandez in 2017.
The Constitutional Court of Bolivia granted the candidacy of Evo Morales for a fourth term in office in 2017, despite a previous referendum that rejected indefinite reelection.
Finally, the Supreme Court of El Salvador ruled in favor of immediate reelection in 2021, opening the possibility of Nayib Bukele to stand as a candidate in 2024.
Legislative: Congresses have approved constitutional reforms to either permit or restrict reelection, depending on political representation and affinity with the incumbent president. The Legislative power is the regular and most common pathway for such reforms. For example, in Colombia, Congress endorsed a reform in 2004 to allow consecutive reelection, which enabled Alvaro Uribe to run for office in 2006, but they have also acted to restrict or balance the system. In Colombia, the initial enactment permitting reelection was later revoked with the “Balance of Powers Law” in 2015 (Acuña Villarraga, 2015).
Referendum: The population has been directly consulted regarding presidential reelection. In Venezuela, indefinite reelection was approved through a referendum in 2009, while in Ecuador, the referendum held in 2018, during the government of Lenin Moreno, established immediate reelection without the possibility of it being presented again, reverting the indefinite reelection authorized by constitutional amendment in 20152.
4. Concluding remarks
Latin America faces the challenge of finding a balance between the continuity of political projects and the preservation of democratic institutions. The experience gained in recent decades shows that presidential reelection can be a useful tool for political stability but also a risk to democracy if not implemented with adequate controls.
Expansive reforms have allowed popular leaders to consolidate political projects but, at the same time, have sparked concerns about power concentration and the erosion of democratic institutions. On the other hand, restrictive reforms have been fundamental in strengthening power alternation and preventing the emergence of authoritarian regimes.
The pathways used to implement these reforms (legislative, jurisdictional, constitutional, and referendum) reflect the diversity of political contexts in the region. Nonetheless, these reforms must be promoted with transparency and wide citizen participation to guarantee its legitimacy.
References
Acuña Villarraga, F. (2015). ¿Presidentes desatados? Reelección presidencial y cambio institucional en el Área Andina. Análisis Político, 28(83), 73-87. https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v28n83.51647
Acuña Villarraga, F. (2022). La tentación reeleccionista en América Latina: Reformas políticas para prolongar o restringir el mandato presidencial (1977-2021). En F. Freidenberg, Las reformas a la representación política en América Latina (págs. 159-178). Ciudad de México: IIJ-UNAM. Obtenido de https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/14/6983/8.pdf
Buquet, D. (2007). Entre la legitimidad y la eficacia: Reformas en los sistemas de elección presidencial en América Latina. Revista uruguaya de ciencia política, 16(1), 35-49. Obtenido de https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=297322671004
Došek, T. (2018). Reformas de reelección presidencial en América Latina en 2015: Estrategias e intereses electorales de las élites políticas. Revista Derecho Electoral(25), 57-82. Obtenido de https://www.tse.go.cr/revista/art/25/tomas_dosek.pdf
Observatorio de Reformas Políticas en América en Latina. (2021). Base de datos sobre "Sistema Electoral del Poder Ejecutivo en América Latina y sus Reformas". Obtenido de figshare. Dataset.: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.16869293.v2
Treminio Sánchez, I. (2013). Las reformas a la reelección presidencial en América Latina. Estudios Sociológicos, XXXI(91), 59-85. Obtenido de https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/598/59830136003.pdf
Welp, Y., & Lissidini, A. (2016). Democracia directa, poder y contrapoder. Análisis del referendo del 21 de febrero de 2016 en Bolivia. Bolivian Studies Journal(22), 162-190. https://doi.org/10.5195/bsj.2016.157
E-mail: fabianalejandro.acuna@gmail.com
ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6339-4794
X: @acuna_fabian
How to cite:
Acuña, Fabián (24 de febrero del 2025). Presidential Reelection Reforms in Latin America (1977-2025). Blog #LABdata, Observatorio de Reformas Políticas en América Latina. https://observatorioreformas.substack.com/p/6e97ee29-815f-4e75-adac-cee105a80e85
Download the dataset: “Executive Power in Latin America”
The database contains political reforms related to the loosening or tightening of reelection rules in 18 countries of Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela) from 1977 to 2025.
In Bolivia, through the 2016 referendum, the population rejected the possibility of Evo Morales running for a new term; however, this result was later disregarded. (Welp & Lissidini, 2016). Since reelection was not enabled through the referendum, it is not considered a reform.