What Drives Change in Election Years?
by Cristhian Jaramillo, The London School of Economics and Political Science and Observatory of Political Reforms in Latin America.
An election year represents, or should represent, a transition of power and a turning point in the political landscape of democratic governments. These are moments where citizens, political parties, and politicians engage in political activity and serve as critical junctures for institutional reforms. In Latin America, reform has been a central theme in political discourse, frequently invoked by politicians and parties as a mechanism for strengthening institutions and fostering greater inclusion. This is especially true in systems where existing inequalities and/or institutional weaknesses have led to public distrust and, at the same time, demands for change.
However, reforms implemented during election years can profoundly alter the competitive landscape for politicians and political parties, reshaping electoral dynamics and potentially influencing outcomes. Despite its frequency, the motivations driving electoral reforms during election years, as well as the factors influencing their likelihood and timing, remain underexplored.
Examining the interplay between key variables—such as inequality, economic performance, and democratically elected governments—and the timing of reforms is crucial to understand how election years are leveraged to shape political competition. For example, does economic prosperity during election years facilitate reforms, or do structural challenges, such as nondemocratic governance or entrenched inequalities, make reforms more likely?
To address these questions, this analysis draws on the Observatory of Political Reforms in Latin America database, which documents electoral reforms in areas such as the executive, senate, and lower chamber systems, as well as reforms related to direct democracy, media access, and affirmative action. The dataset encompasses 303 reforms across 19 countries from 1917 to 2023. A multinomial logistic regression is used to examine how reform type (categorized as executive, senate, lower chamber, affirmative action, access to media, and direct democracy), inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), GDP, and if the government was democratically elected influence the likelihood of reforms during election years.
The graph shown for this article depicts the odds ratios calculated from four models where there is a progressive addition of variables to show how these influence the likelihood of a reform occurring during election years.
Source: Observatory of Political Reforms in Latin America.
In Model 1, affirmative action significantly predicts reforms during election years (OR=1.17, p=0.017), with a 17% increase in odds, while reforms for the Lower Chamber (OR=1.08, p=0.14) and Senate (OR=1.07, p=0.28) are not significant. In Model 2, affirmative action remains significant (OR=1.16, p=0.015), while the democratically elected variable (OR=3.39) and access to media reforms (OR=1.08, p=0.10) are not.
Model 3 identifies GDP (log) as significant (OR=2.29, p=0.041), suggesting a 129% increase in reform odds. Affirmative action (OR=1.21, p=0.036) remains significant, while democratically elected (OR=4.86, p=0.18) and access to media reforms (OR=1.14, p=0.18) do not. In Model 4, the Gini Coefficient is the strongest predictor (OR=2.54, p=0.001), indicating a 154% increase in reform odds. Affirmative action shows marginal significance (OR=1.25, p=0.06), while GDP (log) is no longer significant (OR=2.40, p=0.17).
These results suggest several important inferences about the dynamics of election-year reforms. There is a consistent significance of affirmative action policies across all models indicating that election years are critical moments for pushing reforms aimed at inclusion and equity. This could reflect political calculations, where parties and politicians use affirmative action reforms to appeal to underrepresented groups. These reforms not only influence the composition of political institutions but also reshape the competitive strategies of political parties by compelling them to include more diverse candidates.
Moreover, the strong and significant role of the Gini coefficient in Model 4 underscores the importance of inequality in driving reforms during election years. High inequality levels likely create social and political pressures that make reforms both necessary and politically practical. Politicians may use these reforms as a tool to pacify discontent or to gain electoral support from marginalized groups. However, the timing of these reforms raises questions about their sustainability and genuine intent.
GDP also plays a significant role in Model 3, suggesting that economic prosperity during election years provides the fiscal and political stability needed to implement reforms. A strong economy may give governments the confidence to introduce potentially contentious reforms without fearing backlash, as voters are less likely to react negatively in periods of economic growth. However, its reduced significance in Model 4 indicates that economic factors alone are insufficient to explain the likelihood of election-year reforms, particularly when inequality is considered.
This analysis highlights the complex interplay of political, economic, and social factors in driving election-year reforms. Affirmative action policies consistently increase the odds of reforms, reflecting their importance as tools for addressing inclusion and equity. Inequality, as captured by the Gini Coefficient, emerges as a critical factor, with higher levels of inequality significantly increasing the likelihood of election-year reforms. Finally, although GDP plays a role, its significance is conditional on the inclusion of other variables.
Election years represent a window of opportunity for institutional change, but the motivations and consequences of these reforms are complex. While they can address pressing societal issues and reshape political competition, their timing and design raise questions about their long-term impact and intent. Policymakers must balance the urgency of addressing systemic challenges with the need to maintain transparency and ensure broad-based support, particularly in the heightened political environment of election years. This study underscores the importance of examining these dynamics to better understand the role of institutional reforms in shaping democratic governance.
Cristhian Jaramillo
c.a.jaramillo-huaman@lse.ac.uk
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Twitter, Instagram: @schrodingercase
Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/cristhian-jaramillo-00888aa6/
How to cite:
Jaramillo, Cristhian (20 de enero del 2025). What Drives Change in Election Years?. Blog #LABdata, Observatorio de Reformas Políticas en América Latina. https://observatorioreformas.substack.com/p/544135b1-7299-43a2-a147-a50c48cfa7cf
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